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Abstract
The unprecedented drop in international trade during the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 
2009 has mainly been analysed at the macroeconomic or sectoral level. However, exporters who are 
heterogeneous in terms of productivity, size or external financial dependence should be 
heterogeneously affected by the crisis.  This issue is examined in this paper by using data on monthly 
exports at the product and destination level for some 100,000 individual French exporters, up to 
2009M4. We show that the drop in French exports is mainly due to the intensive margin of large 
exporters. Small and large exporters are evenly affected when sectoral and geographical 
specialisations are controlled for. Lastly, exporters (small and large) in sectors structurally more 
dependent on external finance are the most affected by the crisis. 
Keywords: financial crisis, international trade, firms’ heterogeneity, intensive and extensive margins 
JEL codes: F02, F10, G01 5
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Non-technical summary
The last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 witnessed a sudden, severe, and synchronised 
drop in world trade (Baldwin and Evenett 2009). The annual volume of world trade fell by 12% 
between September 2008 and September 2009. During this period of time trade fell faster than during 
the first year of the Great Depression, when trade fell by about 8% (League of Nations’ World 
Economic Survey, 1932-33).  
In this paper, we explore the mechanisms that led to such a dramatic collapse in exports using firm-
level data on French exporters. The key questions that we address are the following. First, have 
different firms been affected differently by the crisis, based on their size, their degree of globalisation, 
or their access to external financing? Second, has the sectoral and geographic composition of firms’ 
exports played a role in a trade collapse? Addressing these questions will help shedding light on the 
channels of transmissions of the financial crisis to the real economy. 
Our approach is based on the exploitation of a micro-economic dataset of monthly French firm-level 
exports covering the period up to April 2009. Beyond allowing quantifying the severe burden of 
adjustment that the crisis has imposed on many individual firms, the analysis of the recent episode of 
trade collapse also improves the understanding of the trade effects of a financial crisis.  
Our key findings are the following: 
First, we find that the trade crisis has had a distinctively sectoral focus, with the impact concentrated 
on durable goods, including equipment, investment goods and the automotive industry. More 
generally, the crisis has severely affected firms in sectors heavily dependent on external finance, 
irrelevant of the size or the degree of export diversification of firms, confirming the financial origin of 
the crisis.
Second, most of the adjustment has taken place at the intensive margin, through a reduction in the 
value of existing flows, although market exit rates also increased somewhat, in particular for firms 
with less diversified exports. Yet, the bulk of the crisis has not been determined by the exit of firms 
from exporting. If we differentiate among exporters of different size, it appears that the largest ones 
have been the most affected. This outcome is due to the presence of the largest exporters in the most 
affected sectors and in the most affected destination markets. Once the different geographical and 
sectoral specialisation of small vs. large exporters is taken into account, then all firms appear evenly 
damaged. 
Our results have several interesting implications. To start with, they cast doubt on the assumption that 
the credit crunch hurt the smallest firms first and foremost.  Moreover, they suggest that being more 
globalised may not be an advantage in the context of a global crisis. Large-sized exporters, which tend 
to have a more global reach, have not been spared by the global trade collapse: in fact, firms 
predominantly exporting in more globalised sectors have suffered more, other things being equal. 
crisis so far, in the aftermath of the crisis we may observe an increase in exit-rates that, when it 
Finally, although small exporters with high-growth potential have not been disproportionally hurt by the 
materialises, is likely to concentrate on smaller exporters.6
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1- Introduction 
Much attention has been paid to the unprecedented drop in international trade during the last 
quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009: according to Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2009) 
this drop in world exports is even sharper than during 1929-1930. Beyond a limited 
resurgence of protectionism (Gamberoni and Newfarmer, 2009; Baldwin and Evenett, 2009; 
Bussiere et al., 2009; Eaton et al., 2009), two broad explanations of this collapse of world 
trade have been suggested.
First, the slump in trade has been associated with a sharp deterioration of demand and activity 
worldwide, deterioration which has been particularly severe in the rich club of OECD 
countries (Araujo and Oliveira-Martins, 2009) and for investment goods and the automobile 
industry (Francois and Woerz, 2009). The impact of demand on trade has been worsened by 
the role of inventories (Alessandria et al., 2010). The increasing dominance of manufacturing 
models relying on internationally fragmented supply chains (Tanaka, 2009, Yi, 2009) may 
have magnified the impact of the drop in activity on international trade, as the unusually high 
elasticity of trade to GDP fluctuations also suggests. However, simulations which aim at 
identifying the contribution of the demand channel and that take into account international 
input-output relationships have hardly reproduced the magnitude of the drop in world exports, 
suggesting that additional factors may have played a role (Benassy-Quéré et al., 2009; 
Bussière et al., 2009; Willenbockel and Robinson, 2009).  
Secondly, the intensification of the financial crisis may have led to liquidity shortages and to 
higher risk aversion and negative confidence effects, both on the side of financial institutions 
as well as of producers. A more limited availability of credit and financing – instruments 
especially important in financing import and export activities – may have represented a key 
determinant of the global downturn (Amiti and Wei, 2009).
1 Finally, bottlenecks idiosyncratic 
1 In this context, one can argue that smaller firms should be first and foremost affected by credit 
constrains: while these firms depend on financing via the intermediary of banks, large MNEs are able 
to obtain financing through debt-markets. 7
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to trade credit and financing have also been called into cause (Auboin, 2009). This view is 
however challenged by Levchenko et al. (2009), in the case of US imports and exports. 
But more specifically, the micro-economic dimension of the current episode of trade collapse 
has not been addressed so far using consistent and exhaustive information on individual 
firms’ exports, to the best of our knowledge.
2 Using exhaustive data on the individual 
performance of exporters before and throughout the crisis will help us better understand how 
and why trade has been so adversely affected by the economic downturn.  
We expect exporters which are heterogeneous in their performance and key characteristics 
within sectors to be heterogeneously affected by such a crisis.
3 The so-called New New Trade 
Theory with firm heterogeneity à la Melitz points to the importance of set-up (or beachhead) 
fixed costs which are often sunk on top of exporting variable costs.
4 Under such 
circumstances, one should observe different adjustments of exporters to the crisis on the 
extensive and intensive margins. 
Against this background, this paper aims at disentangling the contribution of various sectoral, 
geographical and micro-economic determinants, including external financial dependence to 
the drop of French exports during the crisis. It relies on monthly data for individual French 
exporters at the product and destination level.
5 The choice of relying on all exporters rather 
that selecting only those for which information on individual financial constraints is available 
(e.g. in balance sheets) is consistent with the ambition of estimating the relative contributions 
of the extensive and intensive margins to the collapse in French exports.
                                                          
2 The exception is Bernard et al. (2009) investigating the impact of the 1997 financial crisis on 
individual US exporters and relying on annual data. They find that the intensive margin had the main 
contribution to the decline in US exports.
3 See Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) and Eaton et al. (2008), providing evidence for the French case of 
such heterogeneity.
4 Sunk costs implied by export participation correspond to advertising, product adaptation to standards, 
gathering of information on regulations, R&D, the translation of the instructions for use, etc. Fixed 
costs correspond to the maintenance of a distribution network, etc. Variable costs correspond e.g. to 
transport costs.
5 More precisely we consider exporters located in France, whatever the nationality of their ownership 
is.8
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We observe that the great bulk of the deterioration of exports appears to have originated from 
the intensive margin, i.e. by means of a reduction of exported volumes, rather than via the 
extensive margin.
6 For example, in February 2009, the intensive margin accounted for more 
than 80% of the total 27.5% year-on-year contraction of French exports. And the top 1% 
exporters, owing to their more global and continued presence on export markets, have been 
the most affected. With a recorded loss of 16.4%, they absorbed more than 70% of the total 
loss in the intensive margin. Indeed, this crisis has posted a sectoral bias, detrimental to 
exports in intermediate and other equipment goods and in the automotive industry. By 
contrast, losses for consumer goods have been rather contained. After controlling for export 
orientation in terms of sectoral specialisation and destination markets served, large and small 
exporters have been similarly affected by the crisis. Similarly we find limited evidence of a 
differential impact of the crisis on firms with different degrees of export differentiation, i.e. 
between firms that focus on few products and markets only vs. firms that export many 
products to many destinations.  
Given the financial nature of the crisis and its strong sectoral component, we will further 
attempt to quantify the impact of credit constraints. Not all sectors are affected in the same 
way by financial constraints: the production technology, which tends to be sector specific, 
determines firms’ financial needs. The interaction between credit constraints and firm 
heterogeneity sharpens the firm selection effect: the churning reallocating market shares from 
the least productive to the most productive exporters is higher than in normal circumstances 
(Manova, 2008). Small and less productive firms may be more affected by credit restrictions 
as a result of their size or lack of sufficient collateral or credit guarantees (Greenaway et al., 
2007; Muûls, 2008). Regarding crisis times, Iacovone and Zavacka (2009) disentangle the 
demand-side (import contraction affecting in particular durable goods) and supply-side (such 
as the lack of external finance) determinants of the drop in sectoral exports during a banking 
crisis. Still, both Manova (2008) and Iacovone and Zavacka (2009) address the trade margins 
                                                          
6 This result contrasts with the findings of Berman and Hericourt (2009) according to which access to 
external finance has a positive impact on the entry decision into the export market.9
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at a rather aggregated level: respectively 27 sectors (comprising 4-digit SITC products) and 
38 (4-digit ISIC) sectors. 
Our investigation on the effect of financial constraints on the dynamics of French firms’ 
exports will make use of differences across sectors in their dependence on external finance, 
following the Rajan and Zingales (1998) methodology. We will calculate our indices of 
financial dependence based on a dataset of French firms included in our data-sample and to 
the data-period under estimation. Considering the period from 2007M1 to 2009M4, the 
growth rates of exports will be regressed on the sectoral foreign demand on each market, on 
firms’ size or diversification, on a sectoral measure of financial dependence, plus an 
interaction term between the crisis interacted with firms’ size and financial dependence. 
We conclude that size ultimately did not matter in the recent trade crisis, but that the degree 
of sectoral external financial dependence matters, both in pre-crisis times and during the 
crisis. While firms in sectors extensively relying on external finance appear to have had a 
competitive advantage and to export more than the average firm before the crisis, this 
advantage appears to have reversed during the recent turmoil. Belonging to a sector ranked in 
the top decile in terms of financial dependence is shown here to have a strong negative bias 
on the export performance in the period of the crisis, whatever the size of the exporter. It is 
worth stressing that our approach does not address the issue of export credit constraints faced 
by individual exporters. We do not rely on the individual exporters financial constraints and 
we do not make use of export credit data. We look at these issues in another paper (Bricongne 
et al. 2010) 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 presents the data. Section 2 provides 
detailed evidence on the evolution of firms’ exports during the crisis. Section 3 decomposes 
trade margins and section 4 addresses the impact of financial dependence on individual export 
performance. Section 5 checks the robustness of the results to an alternative method of 
clustering firms across groups. The last section concludes. 10
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1- Data 
We rely on individual firms exports recorded on a monthly basis by the French customs. The 
period covered is 2000M1 to 2009M4.
7 We drop Harmonised System (HS2) Chapters 99 
(Commodities not elsewhere specified) and 98 (Commodities specified at chapter level only) 
as well as monetary gold, from the data. 
Each exporter is identified by its identification number (SIREN). This code allows in 
principle to merge the data with the Amadeus database and thereby to match exports with 
financial information. However, as we do not have sufficient financial information for a 
relatively large subset of firms, we use the financial information from Amadeus to construct 
financial indicators at the HS2 level, which we then match with the dataset of firms’ exports.  
In order to control for developments in global demand, we use monthly sectoral data at the 
two-digit level of the Harmonised System for 52 countries, as provided by the ITC 
(UNCTAD-WTO, Geneva). The tagging by HS2 allows to categorise goods into 97 different 
sectors.
A first glance at the monthly French customs data (Figure 1) points to a steep decline in the 
value of total exports from September 2008 onwards. The number of French exporters, which 
has been on a decreasing trend since the year 2000, also appears to have further contracted in 
the crisis: from 50,458 units in October 2008 to 46,616 units in April 2009. While seasonality 
and the number of working days may bias the results somewhat, all in all about 3,800 firms 
stopped exporting, corresponding to 7 percent of the average number of monthly exporters 
over the whole ten year period considered. In conclusion, the comparison of data series 
relative to total exports values with the series on the number of exporters suggests that the 
bulk of the adjustment has been on the intensive rather than on the extensive margin.  
                                                          
7 Two different thresholds apply for individual firms when it comes to the declaration of their exports. 
When exporting to a non-EU country, the threshold is 1,000 euros. When exporting to a Member state, 
the declaration is compulsory if the yearly cumulated value of exports to the other 26 EU Member 
states is larger than 150,000 euros. Using monthly data, it is unclear how this issue of threshold could 
be effectively tackled. Moreover we are interested in changes over time, and not in absolute figures. 
Hence we consider this issue of second order importance.11
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-- Figure 1 about here -- 
Each exporter ships its products in one or more product categories defined at the Combined 
Nomenclature 8 digits level (CN8) comprising some 10,000 different categories. Each 
category of product exported by a given firm can be shipped to more than one market. 
Accordingly, the most granular piece of information available in the French customs database 
is the value exported each month by a French resident firm in a CN8 category to each 
destination country. From a simple statistical point of view, the resulting four-dimensional 
data point should be defined as an elementary flow. On average, 629,000 elementary flows 
were recorded monthly over the period from 2005M1 to 2009M4.  
Changes in trade flows over time may originate from changes in any of the following: number 
of exporters, number of products, destination markets served and value shipped per each 
elementary flow. In our analysis, however, we will aggregate the product dimension of the 
data in sectors. Thus, our dependent variable will comprise export flows, where each data 
point corresponds to the value of exports of all exported products categorised under CN8 
categories belonging to the same HS2 sector by each French exporter to each destination 
country. In other words, we cumulate all products exported within a sector at the firm level, 
by destination.
8 Consolidating, at the firm-level, the additional information on the product 
dimension into a sectoral information helps evaluating results. While eliminating noise from 
the data and rendering the dataset more manageable, it takes into account that the current 
crisis appears to have had a distinctive sectoral dimension, as stylised facts from aggregate 
data suggest (effect strongest on durable goods, financial dependence of firms clearly 
following a sectoral dimension, etc.). 
2- Firm exports’ developments during the crisis by size class 
                                                          
8 Incidentally, a firm may appear several times in the database, if it exports CN8 products belonging to 
more than one HS2 sector. It should be noted however that, each time, only its exports relative to the 
relevant sector are taken into account. 12
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The first issue we address is whether large and small exporters have been affected differently 
by the crisis. Since our objective is to address the respective contributions of the intensive and 
extensive margins to the drop in French exports, we must keep the full sample of firms and 
thus work with export data only.  We will accordingly use the following two alternative 
methods to rank exporters. 
Firstly, we will rank firms, within their sectors, according to the total value of their exports 
relative to the exports of all other firms exporting in the same sector, in a given month.
9
Hence the monthly composition of the quantiles in a given sector actually varies. Note that an 
individual firm can belong to different quantiles in different sectors owing to the fact that it 
can export in more than one HS2 Chapter. Since one may however challenge the use of such 
ranking for calculating quantiles’ contributions to the observed changes in exports – the 
contribution of a given quantile is bounded by its overall weight – we also use a second 
method whereby the ranking is not determined by the size of exports. 
The second method of ranking is based on a criterion of diversification of exports at the 
individual firm level. We count the number of elementary flows by each firm (number of 
CN8 positions x destination markets in which exports are recorded at the firm level) and rank 
firms within quantiles accordingly. It is worth stressing here the underlying rationale of this 
alternative method of clustering firms in quantiles. Some very large French exporters in value 
are “champions”, exporting a single CN8 to a very limited number of markets each month, 
but realising huge export values per elementary flow. Moreover, assuming a low frequency of 
trade relationships, the destination market of such exports may change from month to month. 
In such a scenario, these “champion-exporters” are categorised in the top percentile in terms 
of exported value, but would be classified in the bottom of the distribution in terms of 
diversification, inflating the extensive margin of the respective groups. We can safely assume 
                                                          
9 This approach does not consist in ranking all firms having exported at least once during the preceding 
12 months in a given sector, as opposed to the status of operator on a yearly basis used by the French 
customs. Note that any other definition of quantiles aiming at keeping their population constant would 
miss at least the entry decisions. Our definition is consistent with the choice of performing an analysis 
of the whole universe of French exporters.13
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that such scenario well applies to sectors such as aeronautics, ship building, etc. At the other 
end of the range of possible scenarios, we can imagine that some over-productive firms are 
able to export to many destinations while still remaining relatively small in terms of total 
value of exports, for instance because they are (French) leaders but in a very small and 
specialised market. This alternative method, whose aim is to control for these extreme cases, 
will be used as a test of robustness of our results in Section 5.  
It is worth stressing that the extreme concentration of the losses among the top exporters 
made it worth categorising firms in four quantiles, using both criteria – value and 
diversification: the 1 percent largest exporters in each HS2 Chapter constitutes a single 
cluster, which we call Group 4. When using the value criterion, this group accounts for 63 
percent of all French exports. Group 3 comprises exporters in the 95-99 percentiles, 
accounting for a further 24 percent of exports. Group 2 comprises exporters in the 80-95 
percentiles and covers 11 percent of the total. The remaining bottom 80% of exporters, which 
belongs to Group 1, only accounts for a residual 3 percent exports. The observed 
concentration is more limited when the criterion of diversification is used: the share of 
Groups 1, 2, 3, and 4 in the total value of French exports is respectively 11 percent, 23 
percent, 27 percent and 39 percent. 
Also, the number of firms exporting by sector during the year is larger than the same number 
exporting during a specific month. This warning helps interpreting Figure 2 that plots the 
monthly total value of exports by quantile, cumulated over the 96 sectors. Quantiles are here 
defined in terms of values of exports (i.e. value criterion defined above). Export losses appear 
to be concentrated among the 1 percent largest exporters (Group 4), rather than on small 
exporters, as one would expect owing to their presumed larger sensitivity to contractions in 
external demand and to credit shortages. This outcome however should not be taken at face 
value, as it primarily reflects the large concentration of the value of exports on a tiny 
proportion of large exporters. The latter, unlike small exporters, do export every month and 
throughout the entire period of observation, thereby registering the highest losses. 14
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-- Figure 2 about here -- 
The stronger impact of the crisis on exports by the largest exporters is confirmed by plotting 
year-on-year changes, calculated as the 12-month rate of change. Using the value criterion to 
define quantiles, we report in Figure 3 evidence showing again that the 1 percent largest
exporters of each export sector have been the most affected by the crisis. We observe a 31 
percent drop in the exports of Group 4 in January 2009, against 9 and 11 percent for exporters 
in Groups 1 and 2 respectively. Interestingly, however, from February 2009 onwards, these 
differences shrink: in April, the losses for exporters in Group 4 are only twice the size of 
those borne by exporters in Group 1.
10
-- Figure 3 about here -- 
Given this background, an analysis of the margins of trade becomes necessary to further 
explore the mechanisms at play during the crisis. The purpose of such analysis is to assess 
what part of the recent evolution of trade arose from changes in the volumes of shipments 
(intensive margin) and what part from the contribution of firm-destination specific dynamics 
of entry and exit (extensive margin). 
3- Decomposition of trade margins and contribution of the sectoral dimension 
Different strategies have been adopted in the literature to disentangle the margins of trade, but 
these have been usually computed on annual flows. Calculating the margins of trade on 
monthly firm-level data is more challenging. Not only biases might arise due to problems of 
seasonality and different patterns of working days, but in addition monthly data imply a large 
turnover of exporters and flows: as already stressed, not all exporters are exporting each 
month, and this is even truer for the individual products exported to each destination markets. 
Hence, when using monthly data, it is not possible to rely on a decomposition akin to the one 
based on yearly data. More specifically, it is not possible to define and compute the intensive 
                                                          
10 It is worth noting that losses in the other groups are mechanically cushioned with this method: a firm 
in the top 1 percent facing a drop in its exports may well be downgraded to Group 2 accordingly, and 
thus boost exports for this group.15
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margin as the change in the value of the flows present continuously throughout the considered 
period. Indeed this method would lead to a sharp underestimation of the reality. 
Given these constraints we adopt a different method, proposed by Buono et al. (2008) and 
Davis and Haltiwanger (1992). This method provides an alternative – and incidentally more 
precise – assessment of the extensive margin: when summing up the margins, it allows to 
correctly approximating the observed aggregate growth rates of exports.
11  It relies on the so-
called mid-point growth rate whose main advantage over more traditional methods is that it 
makes it possible to compute growth rates for newly created or destroyed flows. Namely, with 
this method we decompose the year-on-year changes to the overall value of French exports 
into four components: entries, exits, continuing flows with positive growth and continuing 
flows with negative growth. The extensive margin is provided by the difference between 
entry and exit rates and the intensive margin by the difference between positive and negative 
growth rates. The mid-point growth rate is computed on elementary flows defined as in 
Section 1: the monthly export flows by a French firm to a given destination of all CN8 
products in a same HS2 sector. 
For a firm i exporting a value x to country c and in sector k at month t, the midpoint growth 
rate is defined as: 















Similarly, the weight attributed to each flow gickt is given by the relative share of the flow in 
























                                                          
11 In Buono et al. (2008) the method here described is applied to yearly data.16
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Finally, the year-on-year growth rate of the total value of French exports is given by summing 





ickt ickt t g s G
Provided that the elementary trade flows in a sector can each month be classified into four 
subsets (created – disappeared – increased – decreased) Gt can also be computed by 
aggregating separately flows corresponding to the above mentioned four contributions:
extensive positive (entry), extensive negative (exit), intensive positive (increase in existing 
flows), intensive negative (reduction in existing flows).
13
To further illustrate this method, let us consider the pre-crisis period (2002-2007) and 
compute the corresponding decomposition using yearly data. Table 1 shows the simple 
averages of contributions. It is worth noting that according to our definition a new flow can be 
a new exporting firm (to a given destination in a given sector), or a new destination served by 
an incumbent exporter. 
-- Table 1 about here -- 
According to the results in Table 1, over the period 2002-2007, the overall increase in the 
value of French exports, estimated at 3.9%, is driven by changes in the intensive margin: 
increased sales in existing flows (firm x destination) alone appears to have recorded a 21.1% 
yearly increase. Reduced sales in existing flows however absorb a large share of these gains, 
leading to an overall net positive contribution of the intensive margin to French export 
dynamics of 3.2%, i.e. about four fifths (82%) of the observed 3.9% yearly increase in 
exports. The remaining one fifth is contributed by the extensive margin, where a slight 
positive difference between entries and exits emerges. 
                                                          
12 G represents a good approximation of the log change in total exports.
13 Indeed all flows corresponding to an entry will post a value of +2 while all flows corresponding to 
exits a value of -2. Finally all changes in the size of existing flows will post a value comprised between 
-2 and 0, if the flows have decreased over time, and a value comprised between 0 and +2, if the flows 
have instead increased over time.17
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Turning to monthly changes we expect more entries and exits than with annual data, as a 
result of the large turnover of elementary flows over months: one particular exporter might 
export in a given sector to a given destination only in February in year t and only March in 
year t+1. In this case, it will be counted as an exit in February t+1 and an entry in March t+1. 
However, the net contribution of the extensive margin should not be much inflated by the use 
of monthly data. This issue is addressed in the last row of Table 1, using the last month of our 
sample as example. The monthly gross contributions to the extensive margin are 17.4% and -
16.5% in December 2007. This is much more than the average 6.5% and 5.9% observed over 
the 2003-2007 period. But the net contributions (0.9% in December, 0.6% over 2003-2007) 
are not too different. 
We now consider the month of February 2009 to illustrate our method.  Overall 80% of the 
observed -27.5% drop accrues to the intensive margin, with volumes of individual flows 
having fallen by 22.7% compared to their level in February 2009 (see Table 2). In other 
words, one fifth at most of the observed drop in exports is due to missing flows (firm x 
destination, in a sector). Not surprisingly, firms in all quantile groups record negative figures 
in both the intensive and extensive margins.
14 Nevertheless, the main contributor to the 
negative intensive margin is the group of the 1% largest exporters: for existing flows and on 
average, 67.4% of the value of the February 2009 losses is concentrated in the top 1% firms. 
Interestingly this figure is not so different from the share of exports by this group in total 
French exports. 
-- Table 2 about here -- 
Having described the method we can now use it to characterise the micro-dynamics of French 
exports during the crisis. We focus on the sub-period running from January 2008 to April 
2009. We will consider separately the four components of the variations recorded year-on-
year. Indeed the different components may signal financing problems relative to specific 
aspects of the exporting activity: changes in entry rates may signal problems in financing the 
                                                          
14 Quantiles are defined here on the basis of value of exports.18
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fixed sunk costs necessary to enter new markets; changes in exit rates instead may signal the 
impossibility to continue operating due to difficulties in bridging cash flow gaps with external 
financing.  Finally, changes in the intensive margin can signal changes in demand conditions 
or a redistribution of market shares. In order to correct for seasonal and working-day 
variations, we apply to the raw data the “cvs-cjo” corrections calculated by the French 
Customs for large aggregates.
15
The contribution of entry (new exporters x destination in a sector) is shown in Figure 4. 
According to the literature on finance and trade shortly referred in the introduction of the 
paper, small and less productive firms, or firms highly dependent on external finance, are 
expected to suffer the most from the drying-up of credit. In contrast, firms benefiting from 
large collaterals, e.g. firms that being part of large groups could either borrow more easily or 
rely on internal sources of financing, are expected to be able to better cushion episodes of 
credit shortage in the market.
16 This hypothesis however is not confirmed by the data on 
entries: with the exception of a limited decrease in early 2009, we can hardly discern any 
sizeable reduction of entry in Figure 4, suggesting that no major difficulty for financing the 
corresponding fixed costs of market entry has been faced by exporters, irrelevant of their 
size.
17  It is worth stressing however that sunk costs are usually paid by a firm well before its 
entry into a new market. Hence the effects of a credit shortage in 2008Q4–2009Q1 are likely 
to affect only marginally firms’ entry strategies over the period of data availability (up to 
April 2009). Moreover, the mid-point growth rates method does not control for the sectoral 
composition of exports. As the trade crisis appears to have affected sectors unevenly, the 
cross-sectoral evidence reported in Figure 4 may hide more severe impacts on specific 
sectors. We will examine this issue below. 
--Figure 4 about here -- 
                                                          
15 Cf. for instance the French Customs Website (http://www.douane.gouv.fr/) 
16 However being part of a multinational group is not necessarily a good shield when the crisis is global 
and synchronised.
17 The huge drop of the indicator for the 1% largest exporters in January should not necessarily be 
taken as proof of firms market entry responses to the crisis.19
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Developments in firms’ exits – from the exporting activity or  from specific destination and/or 
products – on the other hand may be symptomatic of difficulties in covering the export 
activity, due to costs of fixed or variable nature that cannot be financed with own capital or 
external finance. Problems in financing such costs should lead to exit: either exporters stop 
exporting in a sector, or they reduce the number of destinations they export to and concentrate 
on their core markets as the result of a pecking order of trade, whereby easier to access and 
larger destination are served before more distant and smaller markets. We examine 
developments in exits since the outbreak of the crisis in Figure 5. It appears that indeed, over 
the recent period, firms have increasingly exited particular export markets, irrelevant of their 
size. The increase in exits from the exporting activity is ascertained for firms in the four 
quantile-groups. It appears that the acceleration started in September 2008 for the top 1% 
exporters, but earlier for the 80-95 percentile group, possibly reflecting the increases in 
energy costs and deterioration of global demand that had started in the previous months. The 
contribution of the top 1% exporters is dominant but falls short of the share of this group in 
total French exports. 
--Figure 5 about here -- 
Abstracting from exporters’ sector and destination market specialisations, we conclude from 
the previous analysis that the contribution of the extensive margin to the decline in French 
exports is limited (one fifth at most). Moreover, it appears to be mostly explained by an 
increase in exit rates rather than by a reduction in entries from exporting markets. All in all, 
the great bulk of the deterioration in exports originated from the intensive margin.
Hence, in Figure 6, we illustrate the reduction in the intensive positive margins. It appears 
that although declining, even during a contraction of the market, a subset of firms increase 
their exports, mirroring the heterogeneity of sectoral developments and the underlying market 
shares redistributions across competitors. Hence, to the extent that the crisis is associated with 
a sharpening of the competitive environment, it represents an opportunity of expansion for top 
performers at the expenses of weaker exporters. This is broadly in line with predictions from 20
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the literature on firm heterogeneity (e.g. Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). More interestingly, the 
negative intensive margin (drop in sales in markets where firms are already present) very 
much contributes to the observed drop in French exports (Figure 7). The largest exporters 
contribute massively to this reduction in sales that, although accelerated from the summer 
2008 onwards, had already started as early as January 2008.  
--Figure 6 about here -- 
--Figure 7 about here -- 
In order to illustrate the sectoral composition of such a drop in the sales of the largest 
exporters on their existing markets, we aggregate the HS2 Chapters into broad sectors of 
activity, namely intermediate goods, consumption goods, automobile, other transport, other 
equipment, plus a residual grouping (see detail in Appendix 1). The breakdown by broad 
sector of the contribution by the top 1% French exporters’ through the negative intensive 
margin is shown in Figure 8. More than one third of the deterioration is attributable to 
intermediate goods (-9.6% out of the overall -26.7% in April 2009). Other equipment goods 
and the car industry contribute with –7.2% (i.e about one fourth) and –5.2% (i.e. about one 
fifth) respectively. In contrast, consumption goods and other transport material
18 play a minor 
role.
-- Figure 8 about here – 
On account of these findings, the next step in our analysis is to systematically disentangle the 
contributions of sector and destination market from the observed “pure” changes in exports. 
In order to do so, we adapt the shift-share method of analysis to the present framework. This 
method of analysis is an adaptation of the weighted variance analysis (ANOVA) which was 
initially developed by studies in regional economics to give a statistical base to the 
geographical structural analysis (Jayet, 1993) and that has been more recently applied to 
international trade (Cheptea et al., 2005). Instead of decomposing a variable’s growth by 
algebraic means (such as the constant market share analysis in the trade field), this method 
                                                          
18 This broad sector basically exports aircraft. From year-on-year Airbus does not ship airliners to the 
same countries and the bulk of the changes in exports is captured by the extensive margin.21
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allows to perform econometric estimations at the most granular level of the data and to 
capture thereby estimated parameters associated with e.g. sectoral or geographical fixed 
effects. Results are independent from the order of decomposition, unlike in decompositions 
based on algebraic methods.  
Elementary growth rates (mid-point growth rates in our case) – weighted by means of the 
variable sikt defined above, i.e. export at time t plus export at time t-12 divided by total exports 
(all exporters, sectors and destinations) at times t and t-12 – are accordingly regressed (at each 
period t) on a set of three dummies variable: countries, sectors and size-groups. Marginal 
averages (i.e. marginal impact of a given sector or destination or size) are computed from the 
estimated fixed effects. This is done for the same period as above, i.e. January 2008 to April 
2009.  
For instance, the mid-point growth rate for the top 1% exporters in April 2009 was equal to –
30.2% (Table 3). However, large exporters are largely represented in the car industry or may 
be exporting to markets heavily affected by the crisis. The contribution of their geographical 
composition of exports was    –0.2% in April and the contribution of the sectoral composition 
of their exports accounted for another –1.1%. Thus, we must correct the apparent mid-point 
growth rate and subtract these two effects to obtain –29.0%. To wrap up, the year-on-year 
drop recorded for the largest exporters in April 2009 would have been  equal to –29.0%, had 
their export structure been similar to the cross-destination and cross-sector average French 
exporter at that date. 
-- Table 3 about here – 
The evidence emerging from the shift-share decomposition and the consecutive correction of 
the mid-point growth rates leads to qualify our initial conclusion according to which large and 
small French exporters have been affected unevenly by the crisis. At first glance, the 
uncorrected growth rates in the left hand side panel of Table 3 point to a large difference 
(almost 9 percentage points) between Group 1 (smallest exporters) and Group 4 (largest 
exporters): on average in April 2009 the smallest exporters recorded only a -21.3% drop in 22
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their exports, and the largest exporters a –30.2% drop. The correction for the sectoral and, to a 
lesser extent, the geographical composition of exports however magnifies the negative impact 
of the crisis on the smallest exporters (to -27.1%), suggesting that these latter mostly belong 
to sectors least affected, such as consumption goods, including food, and this cushioned their 
losses. On the contrary, correcting for the geographical and sectoral orientation of exports 
slightly smoothens the mid-point growth rate computed for the largest exporters (from -30.2% 
to -29.0%). 
All in all, controlling for the sectoral specialisation and geographical orientation, in growth 
rate terms there is limited evidence of a differential impact of the crisis on large and small 
exporters, with one notable exception: the month of February 2009, where the largest 
exporters have been the most severely affected.  
In conclusion, the sharp concentration of French exports on a limited number of firms 
explains why the largest exporters emerged as the main contributors to the observed drop in 
exports. However, exporters of different size have not been affected by the crisis in 
significantly different ways. If a difference must be found between large and small exporters, 
this concerns the timing of the events: the corrected data suggest that the smallest exporters 
have been affected much earlier (already starting in August 2008) than larger exporters, 
whose exports started collapsing only in 2008Q4.  
With all these explanatory elements in hand, we can now perform econometric estimates 
aiming at explaining the individual mid-point growth rates by quantifying the importance of 
sectoral, geographical and microeconomic determinants, including the external finance 
dependence we are ultimately interested in, and of their interactions.  
4- Determinants of individual export performance 
Our aim is ultimately to disentangle the contribution of various sectoral, geographical and 
micro-economic determinants of the drop in individual French firm exports during the crisis, 23
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including external finance dependence. We estimate the following equations on the period 
from 2007M1 to 2009M4 and by means of weighted OLS:
19
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Our dependent variable, the mid-point growth rate of firms’ exports, is measured at the level 
of the individual exporter and is three-dimensional (time, HS2 sector, destination). We are 
using growth rates computed on values and accordingly combining a change in the volumes 
as well as prices. 
A first determinant of the change in exports is the demand for imports in the sector and 
destination market each firms exports to. We compute this demand as sectoral `net’ imports in 
each destination market, where French exports are subtracted from the total imports of the 
destination. This procedure allows to avoid endogeneity problems. Data provided by the 
International Trade Centre (ITC) record monthly imports up to 2009M4 for a subset of only 
52 countries, which however represent about 84% of the value of French exports. Given these 
figures, this variable will control appropriately for the well-documented drop in global 
demand and the extremely skewed sectoral dimension of the crisis. Country-and-time and 
HS2-and-time fixed effects control for any time-varying country determinant, including the 
exchange rate and any sector specific shock. 
A second determinant to be addressed is the overall impact of the crisis, notwithstanding the 
demand and sectoral issues referred to above. Indeed, the general climate of uncertainty and 
its impact on business confidence, shortage of liquidity and a more restrictive access to the 
financing of business activities in some regions of the world may have exacerbated 
contraction of both activity and trade, beyond demand developments. To control for this we 
                                                          
19 The choice of this sub-period is constrained by a computational issue: we have already more than 10 
million observations. Hence enlarging the window would dramatically increase the size of our sample. 24
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create a variable crisis that is a step-dummy taking value 1 from 2008M9 onward. We test the 
sensitivity of our results by considering 2008M5 alternatively.  
Thirdly, we must necessarily control for firms’ heterogeneity. A firms’ size is measured by 
the size of its exports relative to the average French exports in the HS2 sector of belonging 
and it is proxied by a set of dummies qikt which indicate the quantile the firm belongs to (as 
defined above, in exports’ value terms
20).   
Beyond the classical determinants of export performances by individual exporters in a setting 
characterised by firm heterogeneity, this paper aims at addressing the impact of financial 
constraints. Hence, a fifth element of our estimation strategy is the financial constraints’ 
dimension. In designing an estimation strategy suitable assessing the role of financial 
constraints, we must be cautious and ensure that we disentangle appropriately the several 
dimensions of the problem. Firstly, not all sectors are affected in the same way by financial 
constraints. By and large, the production function determines the type of financial needs 
dominant in a sector (See Rajan and Zingales, 1998). On this account, it is likely that in good 
times a well developed financial sector can be the source of a comparative advantage in 
financially constrained sectors. Secondly, during the turmoil, this advantage can be expected 
to reverse due to credit shortage. To capture this second effect, the financial variables must be 
interacted with a variable which well represents the sequencing of the crisis. Thirdly, 
heterogeneous firms may have uneven access to external finance and thus may be affected 
differently both by the financial dependence of the sector and the cross-effect of the crisis and 
financial dependence. 
Our investigation of the effect of financial constraints on the dynamics of French firms’ 
exports uses differences across sectors in their dependence on external finance. Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) use the capital expenditures minus cash flow over capital expenditures as 
their main indicator of financial dependence.  
                                                          
20 sikt (share in total exports of sums at time t and t-12 of firm-sector exports’ value) are used to define 
quantiles. 25
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As we do not have firm-specific financial information relative to each firm for which we have 
trade data, our financial variables are sectoral averages, at the HS2 level (the HS2 
classification categorises goods into some 100 different sectors). Hence, we allocate each firm 
present in Amadeus to its main HS2 sector and compute the export-weighted median of all 
firms in an HS2 sector. In order to limit the impact of outliers, we furthermore class the 
various elementary indicators in quintiles. 
 Our source of financial data, Amadeus, does not report capital expenditure, so we rely on two 
alternative measures which combine information from different financial ratios  
Our first composite indicator (depfi2) ,is constructed as the product of the quintiles a sector 
belongs to according to two criteria. Cash flow over value added proxies for the self-financing 
capacity of the firm. The ratio of financial charges over turnover measures the extent to which 
firms rely on external financing to finance their activity..  
Our second composite indicator, used for robustness analysis, includes a third indicator of 
financial dependence, the ratio of capital employed over fixed assets. We multiply the 
quintiles for each of the three above criteria to obtain depfi3.
Our indicator of financial dependence is time invariant since it is based on the assumption – 
standard in the literature spearheaded by Rajan and Zingales (1998) – that technological 
differences across sectors determine the need of external finance. As the technological needs 
of sectors are slow to evolve, we can assume their time-invariance over the period of 
estimation. In the regressions we use the log of those indicators. 
An innovation of our paper with respect to the previous literature using indices of financial 
dependence is that we calculate our indices of financial dependence based on a dataset of 
firms included in our data-sample (i.e. French firms) and to the data-period under estimation, 
rather than relying on the indices computed by Rajan and Zingales for the 1980s-1990s. 
Indeed demand for durable and investment goods is volatile over the cycle. Hence external 
financial dependence could just be correlated to producing investment and durable goods. The 26
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1227
July 2010
inclusion of sector-time fixed effects (on a monthly basis) allows us to control for such 
sectoral volatility over the cycle. 
Finally, in equation (2) we identify the impact of the financial dependence on the mid-point 
growth rate of firms’ exports by interacting our indicator of financial dependence, whose 
construction has been discussed in the previous paragraphs, with the size of firms.  For 
robustness checking purposes we will furthermore replicate these estimations in Section 5 
using the alternative method of grouping firms within quantiles discussed in Section 2 which 
is based on firms’ diversification of exports rather than exports’ value. 
Two previously mentioned constraints restrict the sample of firms on which estimations are 
performed. First, information on the sectoral demand is not available for all destinations but 
only for a subset of 52 countries. Second, not all HS2 sectors contain a sufficiently large 
number of firms present in Amadeus to be representative enough. We keep the 78 HS2 
sectors for which Amadeus reports more than 30 firms in 2007. 
We now proceed to illustrate the estimation results of Equation (1). The coefficients reported 
in column (1) of Table 4 point to the fact that small exporters record an export growth slightly 
lower than the group of largest exporters, when controlling for the demand addressed in the 
relevant sector and destination market (dlimport). This result is robust to the introduction of 
other controls as shown by the results reported in columns (2) and (3) of Table 4.  
In column (2), we report the coefficients for the estimation where the occurrence of the crisis 
is interacted with the size of the exporter relative to the sectoral average. Column (3) reports 
results where the dummy crisis uses September 2008, unlike results in columns (2), where the 
starting date for the crisis was assumed to be May 2008. Results for all the above 
specifications indicate that – broadly speaking – size differences ultimately did not matter 
much: the differences in estimated parameters are negligible. This result confirms what we 
had already found through the shift-share approach that we used to carry out the correction of 
the mid-point growth rates.  27
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Summing up, a first conclusion is that differences in the size of exporters do not provide the 
key explanation for the differential impact of the crisis on individual exporters.  
We now turn to a complementary explanation, which is the role of external financial 
dependence of individual exporters. We consider the September 2008 starting date for the 
crisis. Two alternative measures of financial dependence are considered.  
Firstly, in column (4) of Table 4, we regress the mid-point growth rates on external financial 
dependence, measured by cash flow over value added and financial charges over turnover 
(ldepfi2) of the HS2 sector of main activity of the firm. This term is interacted with the size of 
the firm, again measured in terms of exports. Additional explanatory variables used in this 
specification include the interaction of these two terms with the crisis dummy.  
The resulting coefficients clearly indicate three facts. First, there is no significant difference 
in the impact of the crisis by size quantile, confirming our previous result. Second, one hardly 
finds any differences in the impact of sectoral financial constraints on exporting firms of 
different size in “normal” times. The positive parameters obtained on the four variables 
interacting of ldepfi2 with q1,..q4 indicate that, notwithstanding differences in size, French 
exporters belonging to sectors extensively relying on external finance have a competitive 
advantage and have more dynamic exports. Third, this advantage reverses during the crisis: 
the estimated parameter on the interaction of crisis1 with ldepfi2 and q1,..q4 is negative and 
not significantly different across the different quantiles of size. Similar conclusions, though 
with less statistical significance can be drawn from column (5) relying on a different indicator 
of financial dependence, where depfi2 is further combined with the ratio of capital employed 
over fixed assets to construct depfi3. The estimations are also robust to a change in the 
starting date assumed for the crisis (May instead of September 2008). Results are presented in 
Appendix 2 of the paper.  
-- Table 4 about here -- 
To sum up our results thus far: 28
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- The crisis has affected exporters of different size evenly, after controlling for the 
sectoral dimension of the turmoil and for the geographical specialisation of firms 
of different sizes. 
- Firms exporting in sectors highly dependent on external finance are structurally 
advantaged in a financially developed country such as France. Other things being 
equal, their export growth is above the average, whatever their individual size. 
- The crisis has severely affected exporters in sectors relying on external finance, 
irrelevant of their size. 
Interestingly, we can compute the effect of the crisis, when the indicator of financial 
dependence is held at its mean, the 10
th and the 90
th percentile. This is done in Table 5, for 
both depfi2 and depfi3.
Let us first concentrate on the left-hand side of the Table, corresponding to depfi2. Before 
commenting these results, it is worth reminding that two different distributions are considered 
here. On the one hand we are interested in the distribution of exporter size within each sector 
(HS2). We have four quantiles of exporters, defined as above using the criterion of total value 
of exports. On the other hand, we have deciles of financial dependence of the sectors 
themselves. The two financial dependence indicators are constructed using individual firm-
level data, but they apply in the same manner for every exporter within a sector. We do not 
introduce in the estimations individual characteristics of exporters in terms of financial 
dependence.
Concerning the dynamics of exports for exporters belonging to different quantiles, the 
estimation results suggest that the group of smallest exporters faces a slightly lower exports’ 
growth over the period of estimation, but the impact of the crisis is similar across the four 
quantiles. On the contrary, belonging to an HS2 sector ranked in the top decile in terms of 
financial dependence has a strong negative bias on the export performance of the firms, 29
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whatever their exports’ size. This result contrasts with a negligible effect on the exporters 
belonging to the least financially dependent sectors.  
-- Table 5 about here – 
Another potentially important determinant of exporters’ performance is their specialisation in 
intermediate goods. Sectors producing goods that are extensively used in intermediate 
consumption by other sectors could have been more severely impaired by the trade crisis 
(Levchenko et al., 2009).  Downstream linkages could have played a role in the transmission 
of the drop in activity, as inventories contraction took place. We use French input-output 
tables for 2006 provided by Eurostat and compute the share of downstream uses (including by 
itself) of each sector. We allocate each individual exporter to its main NACE sector over the 
period and add this variable of downstream linkages and its interaction with the crisis dummy 
to specification (2) in column (6) and (7) of Table 4. Let us stress again, before turning to the 
result that we capture here a sectoral characteristic observed at the level of the NACE 
classification.
21
The negative coefficient on the interaction of our indicator of downstream use and the crisis 
dummy indicates that exporters belonging to sectors largely used as intermediate consumption 
have underperformed during the crisis.  
Interestingly, this control variable is significant despite the presence of both the sectoral 
demand on the destination market and the time-varying sectoral fixed effect in the regression. 
This is due to the use of two different classifications: individual firm exports are classified 
according to HS2 headings, while each firm is associated with its NACE sector when it comes 
to measuring the dependence on downstream use. The two classifications are not defined at 
the same degree of detail, and they do not match. The underlying rationale of the HS is to 
classify traded products, while the NACE is a classification in terms of activity. This leads to 
                                                          
21 The industrial sectors most dependent on downstream uses are `Other mining and quarrying 
products’, `Wood and products of wood ’, `Other non-metallic mineral products’ and `Fabricated metal 
products, except machinery and equipment’.30
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imperfectly controlling for characteristics of the sectors in terms of demand or specific 
shocks, when the HS is used. All in all, our additional variable may be able to better capture 
the sectoral composition effect associated with the crisis as compared to the ones relying on 
the HS classification. Some sectors of intermediate goods have been severely affected by the 
crisis and the related drying of credit. These same sectors also depend heavily on downstream 
uses.
Beyond this debate, what is important to our analysis here is that the inclusion of this 
additional control variable does not change our conclusion regarding exporters’ size and 
financial dependence. 
5- Robustness check defining the quantiles in terms of diversification 
We have so far relied on quantiles defined on the basis of the relative value of individual 
firms exports within a HS2 sector. Accordingly, contributions to the mid-point growth rates 
calculated are dependent from this assumption. Also, even if in section 4 we address the 
growth (and not the level) of individual exports, our results might be sensitive to the 
allocation of our exporters across quantiles. In order to control for the sensitivity of results to 
the allocation of exporters to given quantiles, we rerun the estimations of section 4 using the 
alternative criterion of definition for the quantiles previously discussed, i.e the diversification 
of individual exports, calculated as the number of elementary markets (CN8 positions x 
destination countries) per French firm within a HS2 sector. The 1 percent most diversified 
exporters in each HS2 Chapter constitutes a single cluster, which we call Group 4. Group 3 
comprises exporters in the 95-99 percentiles. Group 2 comprises exporters in the 80-95 
percentiles. The remaining bottom 80% exporters belong to Group 1.  
We firstly replicate our decomposition of export growth over the period 2008M1 to 2009M4 
in a positive extensive margin (entry), a negative extensive margin (exit), a positive intensive 
margin and a negative intensive margin. Results are shown in Figure 9 (to be compared with 
Figure 4) for entry, in Figure 10 (to be compared with figure 5) for exit, in Figure 11 (to be 31
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compared with figure 6) for the positive intensive margin and in Figure 12 (to be compared 
with figure 7) for the negative intensive margin. 
Two main results can be drawn from the comparison of these figures. Firstly, as expected, 
there is much change for entry and exit. Using the criterion of value to rank exporters, the 
largest firms had the largest positive contribution to entry. This result is now reversed: the one 
percent most diversified exporters contribute only marginally: we do face champions in their 
own export niche, hardly changing their strategy during the turmoil. On the contrary, the least 
diversified exporters, exhibiting limited duration of their exports on their elementary markets, 
contribute largely. The same explanation pertains to the contribution of exits. The least 
diversified exporters contribute the most to exits, while the most diversified contribute only 
marginally. The latter keep their portfolio of markets rather constant and ultimately contribute 
at most to their weight in the total value of exports. 
The second key observation is that the positive and negative intensive margins are much less 
affected by our change of metric. The largest exporters in value, as well as the most 
percentile is reduced, while the contribution of the last percentile is increased. What we see 
now is that diversified large exporters, exporting many products to many markets face a 
plummeting of their sales on all markets similar to the one faced by firms exporting large 
values. Their negative contribution is still 17% at the end of the period considered, to be 
compared with 25% with the criterion of value.  
All in all, given the overwhelming contribution of the intensive margin to the total change in 
French exports, our conclusions are fairly robust: the large and diversified exporters account 
for most of the drop in French exports during the turmoil. 
-- Figure 9 about here -- 
-- Figure 10 about here -- 
-- Figure 11 about here -- 
diversified are the main contributors. The only difference is that the contribution of the first 32
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-- Figure 12 about here -- 
The next robustness check is to perform the shift share correction using this new criterion of 
diversification. Results are given in Table 6, to be compared with Table 3. As in the 
estimations with quantiles defined in terms of export value, the uncorrected growth rates in 
the left hand side panel of Table 6 point to a large difference between the Group 1 (here the 
least diversified exporters) and Group 4 (the most diversified exporters): on average in April 
2009 the least diversified exporters have recorded a –26.2% drop in their exports, and the 
most diversified exporters a –32.4% drop. Also as with the definition of quantiles in terms of 
export value, the correction for the sectoral and geographical composition of exports 
magnifies the negative impact of the crisis on the least diversified exporters (-28.4%). On the 
contrary, correcting for the geographical and sectoral orientation of exports smoothes the mid-
point growth rate computed for the most diversified exporters (-29.9%). Overall, our 
conclusions are robust to the change in classification criterion and there is limited evidence of 
a differential impact of the crisis on well diversified and poorly diversified exporters when 
one controls for the orientation of their exports.  
-- Table 6 about here – 
The last step of our robustness check consists in replicating our econometric estimates using 
the definition of quantiles of exporters in terms of export diversification. Results are shown in 
Table 7. In column (2) we observe that the lower performance in terms of export growth no 
longer affects the quantile of the smallest exporters, but now the two quantiles of the least 
diversified ones. More importantly, here again, there is hardly a significant difference in 
terms of impact of the crisis on the four quantiles of exporters. If a difference is to be 
captured, it is beneficial to the least diversified exporters. The latter result is in line with the 
explanation referred to above: some large and resilient exporters may be little diversified. 
These results are confirmed in column (3) when the starting point of the crisis is supposed to 
be September 2008.  In column (4) and (5), we introduce our indicators of financial 
dependence. Results are qualitatively similar to the ones presented in Table 4.  Exporting in a 33
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financially constrained sector provides in general a competitive advantage in normal times, 
whatever the diversification of the exporters. As regards the magnitude of such effect, a 
difference must be made with the previous estimations based on the criterion of export value. 
We observe here that the impact is increasing in the diversification of exports. On the 
contrary, during a credit crisis, this becomes an obstacle for exporters, and this evenly 
affecteds their exports whatever their diversification. All in all, our results are robust to a 
change in the criterion for ranking: export value versus export diversification. 
6- Conclusion 
A consensus is forming that, beyond the sizeable fall in demand and a limited resurgence of 
protectionism, three elements have played a key role in explaining the harsh response of 
economic activity and trade to the recent crisis: first, a composition effect; second, the 
increasing reliance on manufacturing models dominated by complex international value 
chains and; third, financing difficulties and shortage of liquidity linked to the intensification 
of the financial crisis. Credit attrition may have affected particularly strongly sectors relying 
heavily on external finance, in line with the seminal argument of Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
Such dependence of the sectoral export performance on external finance has been addressed 
in this paper using firm-level data for French exporters throughout the crisis.  
Our micro-analysis suggests that the trade crisis has had a distinctively sectoral focus, with 
the impact concentrated on durable goods, including equipment, investment goods and the 
automotive industry. More generally, the collapse of trade came mainly through the intensive 
margin although market exit rates also increased, in particular for firms with less diversified 
exports. Clearly, the exit of exporters from the market is not the main driver of the trade 
collapse.
If we differentiate among exporters of different sizes, it appears that the largest ones have 
been the most affected. This unexpected outcome is due to the presence of the largest 
exporters in the most affected sectors and in the most affected destination markets. Indeed, if 
-- Table 7 about here – 34
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we take the sectoral and geographical composition of exports into account, then all firms have 
been evenly hit.
The econometric analysis nevertheless points to a differential impact of financial dependence, 
both in pre-crisis times and during the crisis. Firms in sectors extensively relying on external 
finance appear to have had a competitive advantage and export more than the average firm 
before the crisis. By contrast, during the crisis this advantage appears to have reversed. 
Belonging to a sector ranked in the top decile of financial dependence negatively impacts a 
firm’s export performance in the period of the crisis, whatever its size. The effects of external 
finance are robust to controlling for the fact that more globalised sectors (where intermediate 
imports account for a larger share of the value of final production), have also been hit more 
severely. Qualitatively similar results hold when firms are categorised by degree of export 
diversification rather than size of exports and are robust to alternative specifications of 
financial dependence. 35
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Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. 3-months moving averages. Left scale: euros. 
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Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. 3-months moving averages. Exporters are ranked 
according to the value of their exports within a sector. Group 1 comprises exporters in the 0-79 
percentiles, group 2 exporters in the 80-94 percentiles, group 3 in the 95-99 percentiles. Group 4 
comprises the 1 percent largest exporters. 
Source: French customs data, own calculations 40
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1227
July 2010
Figure 3: Percent change in the total value of French exports, by quantile of exporters, 





































































































Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. Exporters are ranked according to the value of their 
exports within a sector. Group 1 comprises exporters in the 0-79 percentiles, group 2 exporters in the 
80-94 percentiles, group 3 in the 95-99 percentiles. Group 4 comprises the 1 percent largest exporters. 
Source: French customs data, own calculations 41
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Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. Exporters are ranked according to the value of their 
exports within a sector. 
Source: French customs data, own calculations 42
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Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. Exporters are ranked according to the value of their 
exports within a sector. 
Source: French customs data, own calculations 43
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Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. Exporters are ranked according to the value of their 
exports within a sector. 
Source: French customs data, own calculations 44
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Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. Exporters are ranked according to the value of their 
exports within a sector. 
Source: French customs data, own calculations 45
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Figure 8: Contribution of negative growth to the top 1% exporters sales’ mid-point 





































Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. Exporters are ranked according to the value of their 
exports within a sector. 
Source: French customs data, own calculations 46
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Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. Exporters are ranked according to the diversification 
of their exports within a sector. 
Source: French customs data, own calculations 47
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Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. Exporters are ranked according to the diversification 
of their exports within a sector. 
Source: French customs data, own calculations 48
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Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. Exporters are ranked according to the diversification 
of their exports within a sector. 
Source: French customs data, own calculations 49
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Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. Exporters are ranked according to the diversification 
of their exports within a sector. 
Source: French customs data, own calculations 50
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Bottom 80% exporters 0.6  -0.5  0.0  0.2  -0.2  0.0  0.0 
80-95% 1.2 -1.1  0.1  1.4  -1.4  0.0  0.1 
95-99% 1.7 -1.5  0.2  4.0  -3.6  0.4  0.6 
Top 1% exporters 3.0  -2.7  0.3  15.5  -12.7  2.8  3.1 
All 6.5 -5.9  0.6  21.1  -17.9  3.2  3.9 
All (december 2007) 17.4  -16.5  0.9 24.9 -21.1 3.7  4.6 
Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. Simple averages of contributions calculated for each 
year, with the exception of last row. Exporters are ranked according to the value of their exports within 
a sector. 
Source: French customs data, own calculations 51
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Bottom 80% exporters 1.5  -2.0  -0.5  0.4  -0.6  -0.2  -0.6 
80-95% 3.0 -4.1  -1.1  2.0  -3.5  -1.6  -2.7 
95-99% 4.0 -5.7  -1.8  4.3  -8.8  -4.5  -6.3 
Top 1% exporters 5.3  -6.9  -1.6  10.1  -26.5  -16.4  -18.0 
All 13.8 -18.7  -4.9  16.7  -39.3  -22.7  -27.5 
Note: Chapters 98 and 99 of the HS2 are dropped. Exporters are ranked according to the value of their 
exports within a sector. 
Source: French customs data, own calculations52
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Table 3: Mid-point growth rate of exports (year-on-year) by group of exporter before 
and after correction for export composition (sectoral and geographical) 
Before correction  After correction 
Group 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
2008-01 5.1 8.5 7.2  11.5  7.8 10.2 7.9 10.8
2008-02 4.7  10.2 11.4  11.6  2.4 9.3 10.5 12.2
2008-03 -4.1  3.4 5.0  4.8  -1.8 4.9 5.6 4.2
2008-04 2.9 4.8 6.2 3.8  2.3 3.7 4.5 4.6
2008-05 -2.9 -0.1 5.3  0.6  -3.2 -0.2 4.5 0.9
2008-06 -4.9  1.4 7.6  6.5  -3.3 1.7 7.2 6.5
2008-07 0.6 1.3 2.9 6.7  2.6 3.0 3.0 6.3
2008-08 -7.4 -1.4 2.0  1.6  -7.2 -1.3 1.1 1.9
2008-09  -2.6 0.7 -0.4 2.9  -3.1 -0.3 -1.4 3.4
2008-10 -7.0 -2.6 -4.5 -5.8 -9.5 -5.0 -6.0 -4.8
2008-11  -13.5 -8.8 -10.7 -5.4  -14.1 -9.3 -10.9 -5.2
2008-12 -11.1 -11.5 -17.9  -9.0  -9.9 -10.4 -14.8 -10.4
2009-01 -20.1 -20.5 -23.2 -30.2  -26.2 -25.9 -25.4 -28.1
2009-02 -21.6 -24.3 -26.1 -28.9  -22.6 -26.1 -26.8 -28.3
2009-03 -16.6 -19.8 -21.1 -26.5  -23.8 -25.7 -23.6 -24.2
2009-04 -21.3 -23.1 -26.2 -30.2  -27.1 -27.4 -26.9 -29.0
Note: Group 1 comprises exporters in the 0-80 percentiles, group 2 exporters in the 80-95 percentiles, 
group 3 in the 95-99 percentiles. Group 4 comprises the 1 percent largest exporters. Exporters are 
ranked according to the value of their exports within a sector. 
Source: French customs data, own calculations 53
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Table 4: Dependent variable year-on-year mid-point growth rate of monthly exports for 
individual exporters (2007M1-2009M4) 
Parameter  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Intercept  -0.228***  0.002 0.002 -0.196*** -0.249*** -0.23***  -0.286***
(-41.70)  (0.35) (0.29) (-3.21) (-3.27) (-3.79)  (-3.79)
dlimport  0.286***  0.286*** 0.285*** 0.285*** 0.286*** 0.286***  0.286***
(213.45)  (213.48) (213.40) (213.38) (213.41) (214.73)  (214.79)
q1 (smallest 
exporters) 
-0.027***  -0.017*** -0.028*** -0.040*** -0.028*** 0.007  0.032***
(-14.54)  (-7.04) (-12.83) (-5.84) (-3.35) (1.00)  (3.85)
q2 0.005***  0.018*** 0.009*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.001  0.018***
(5.27)  (13.28) (7.71) (-5.94) (-4.70) (0.24)  (3.76)
q3 0.015***  0.028*** 0.024*** -0.006*** 0.018*** 0.023***  0.059***
(21.99)  (30.01) (28.70) (-2.29) (5.14) (9.19)  (17.41)
q4 (largest 









crisis1*q1  -0.220*** 0.562*** 0.746*** 0.542***  0.715***
(-25.15) (6.45) (6.88) (6.28)  (6.66)
crisis1*q2  -0.238*** 0.530*** 0.738*** 0.531***  0.725***
(-29.65) (6.13) (6.86) (6.2)  (6.8)
crisis1*q3  -0.254*** 0.530*** 0.695*** 0.530***  0.684***
(-32.30) (6.14) (6.47) (6.2)  (6.43)
crisis1*q4  -0.224*** 0.511*** 0.692*** 0.538***  0.723***
(-28.74) (5.93) (6.45) (6.29)  (6.8)
Continued…. 
Note: Exporters are ranked according to the value of their exports within a sector.   54
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Parameter  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
ldepfi2*q 1  0.151*** 0.136*** 
(3.39) (3.09) 
ldepfi2*q 2  0.161*** 0.149*** 
(3.63) (3.38) 
ldepfi2*q 3  0.161*** 0.143*** 
(3.62) (3.25) 
ldepfi2*q 4  0.144*** 0.146*** 
(3.25) (3.31) 
crisis1*ldepfi2*q 1  -0.559*** -0.544*** 
(-8.88) (-8.73) 
crisis1*ldepfi2*q 2  -0.551*** -0.137*** 
(-8.79) (-8.65) 
crisis1*ldepfi2*q 3  -0.560*** -0.543*** 
(-8.95) (-8.76) 
crisis1*ldepfi2*q 4  -0.533*** -0.534*** 
(-8.52) (-8.61) 
ldepfi3*q 1  0.084***  0.071***
(3.26)  (2.82)
ldepfi3*q 2  0.094*** 0.083***
(3.67) (3.26)
ldepfi3*q 3  0.086*** 0.073***
(3.35) (2.87)
ldepfi3*q 4  0.084*** 0.086***
(3.27) (3.41)
crisis1*ldepfi3*q 1  -0.323*** -0.311***
(-8.87) (-8.62)
crisis1*ldepfi3*q 2  -0.325*** -0.313***
(-9.02)  (-8.76)
crisis1*ldepfi3*q 3  -0.317***  -0.304***
(-8.79)  (-8.51)
crisis1*ldepfi3*q 4  -0.306***  -0.309***
(-8.49)  (-8.65)
Downstream use (DU)  0.119***  0.118***
(38.81)  (38.38)
crisis1*DU  -0.097***  -0.098***
(-16.81)  (-16.83)
10 812 523 10 812 523  10732238  10732238 n 10 812   523 10   812   523 10   812   52355
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 Table 5: Effects of the crisis by quantile of exporter size and by quantile of financial 
dependence of HS2 sectors
depfi2 depfi3 














q  1  -0.023 -0.033  -0.022 -0.029  -0.028 -0.028 
q 2  0.013  -0.003  0.025  0.010  -0.001  0.020 
q 3  0.028  0.012  0.040  0.026  0.022  0.026
q4
crisis1*q 1  -0.561 -0.084  -1.008  -0.269  0.047 -0.602
crisis1*q 2  -0.534 -0.078  -0.972  -0.252 0.060 -0.574
crisis1*q 3  -0.538 -0.073  -0.983  -0.258 0.059  -0.575
crisis1*q 4  -0.525 -0.074  -0.966  -0.246 0.056 -0.560
Note: Exporters are ranked according to the value of their exports within a sector. Computed from 
specification (4) and (5) in Table 4. 56
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Table 6: Mid-point growth rate of exports (year-on-year) by group of exporter before 
and after correction for export composition (sectoral and geographical) 
Before correction  After correction 
Group 1# 2# 3# 4# 1# 2# 3# 4#
2008-01 12.1 12.2 10.3  7.9  11.5 11.1 10.5 8.6
2008-02 17.7 13.5 8.7 10.0  13.3 11.9 10.8 10.5
2008-03 9.6 7.2 5.1 0.8  0.4 6.5 6.2 3.2
2008-04 -1.6 11.0 1.8  4.6  5.8 8.7 1.3 4.1
2008-05 6.5 9.7 -4.3  -0.4  5.5 7.1 -1.6 -0.6
2008-06 10.0 10.9 7.5  0.7  9.7 8.7 6.3 2.9
2008-07 6.3  11.2 4.0 1.8  5.8 9.9 2.3 3.9
2008-08 3.4 6.7 -1.8  -0.9  1.5 4.8 -1.8 0.9
2008-09 4.1 6.8 -2.1 1.1  2.7 2.8 0.5 1.8
2008-10 -1.8 -5.0 -2.3 -8.3 -4.9 -7.7 -1.6 -6.4
2008-11 6.0  -8.9 -5.1  -12.3  1.5 -10.5 -8.6 -7.0
2008-12 5.6  -17.1 -1.0  -21.7  -8.2 -13.3 -6.3 -15.4
2009-01 -19.4 -27.3 -22.6 -33.0  -26.2 -28.1 -22.9 -30.2
2009-02 -20.6 -27.8 -22.7 -33.2  -27.8 -27.4 -25.6 -29.0
2009-03 -25.8 -23.2 -20.1 -27.5  -21.8 -25.2 -21.7 -26.2
2009-04 -26.2 -30.6 -21.9 -32.4  -28.4 -30.8 -24.1 -29.9
Note: Group 1 comprises exporters in the 0-80 percentiles, group 2 exporters in the 80-95 percentiles, 
group 3 in the 95-99 percentiles. Group 4 comprises the 1 percent largest exporters. Exporters are 
ranked according to the diversification of their exports within a sector. 
Source: French customs data, own calculations 57
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Table 7: Dependent variable year-on-year mid-point growth rate of monthly exports for 
individual exporters (2007M1-2009M4) 
Parameter  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Intercept  -0.229*** 0.012** 0.009 -0.285***  -0.356***
(-41.89) (2.23) (1.6) (-4.66)  (-4.67)
dlimport  0.285*** 0.286*** 0.286*** 0.285***  0.285***
(213.76) (213.6) (214.16) (213.39)  (213.43)
q1 # (least diversified) -0.033*** -0.085*** -0.063*** 0.171***  0.291***
(31.3) (-61.75) (-51.28) (44.8)  (57.58)
q2#  0.003*** -0.013*** 0.002** 0.167***  0.160***
(3.83) (-12.56) (2.2) (58.84)  (40.65)
q3#  0.024*** 0.021*** 0.015*** 0.102***  0.129***
(31.91) (21.04) (17.46) (37.39)  (35.82)
q4 # (most diversified)









crisis1*q1#  -0.140*** 0.605***  0.612***
(-17.39) (7.00)  (5.69)
crisis1*q2#  -0.247*** 0.546***  0.758***
(-31.33) (6.34)  (7.06)
crisis1*q3#  -0.220*** 0.496***  0.693***
(-28.06) (5.76)  (6.46)
crisis1*q4#  -0.251*** 0.517***  0.712***
(-32.16) (6.00)  (6.63)
Continued…. 
Note: Exporters are ranked according to the diversification of their exports within a sector.   58
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Parameter  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
ldepfi2*q 1  0.068 
(1.52) 
ldepfi2*q 2  0.104** 
(2.34) 
ldepfi2*q 3  0.149** 
(3.35) 
ldepfi2*q 4  0.196*** 
(4.42) 
crisis1*ldepfi2*q 1#  -0.537*** 
(-8.58) 
crisis1*ldepfi2*q 2#  -0.566*** 
(-9.04) 
crisis1*ldepfi2*q 3#  -0.523*** 
(-8.36) 
crisis1*ldepfi2*q 4#  -0.550*** 
(-8.8) 
ldepfi3*q 1#  0.003
(0.14)
ldepfi3*q 2#  0.069**
(2.68)
ldepfi3*q 3#  0.083***
(3.26)
ldepfi3*q 4#  0.121***
(4.72)
crisis1*ldepfi3*q 1#  -0251***
(-6.96)
crisis1*ldepfi3*q 2#  -0.336***
(-9.32)
crisis1*ldepfi3*q 3#  -0.305***
(-8.46)
crisis1*ldepfi3*q 4#  -0.321***
(-8.92)
n 10812523 10812523 10812523 10812523  1081252359
ECB
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Appendix 2 - Estimation results controlling for financial dependence (breakpoint: May 
2008)   
(1)  (2) 
Intercept  -0.091 -0.119
(-1.54) (-1.61)
dlimport  0.289*** 0.289***
(214.63) (214.66)
q 1  -0.026*** -0.017
(-3.37) (-1.78)
q 2  -0.006 -0.009*
(-1.59) (-1.74)
q 3  -0.005* 0.015***
(-1.85) (4.01)
q 4  0.000 0.000
. .
crisis*q 1  0.409*** 0.571***
(4.78) (5.37)
crisis*q 2  0.386*** 0.561***
(4.54) (5.30)
crisis*q 3  0.416*** 0.560***
(4.90) (5.29)
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Appendix 2 (cont.)
(1)  (2) 
ldepfi2*q 1  0.073*
(1.70)
ldepfi2*q 2  0.081*
(1.89)
ldepfi2*q 3  0.086***
(2.01)
ldepfi2*q 4  0.068
(1.59)
crisis*ldepfi2*q 1  -0.470***
(-7.60)
crisis*ldepfi2*q 2  -0.460***
(-7.47)
crisis*ldepfi2*q 3  -0.477***
(-7.75)
crisis*ldepfi2*q 4  -0.459***
(-7.46)
ldepfi3*q 1  0.040
(1.60)
ldepfi3*q 2  0.049**
(1.97)
ldepfi3*q 3  0.044*
(1.78)
ldepfi3*q 4  0.040
(1.62)
crisis*ldepfi3*q 1  -0.273***
(-7.64)
crisis*ldepfi3*q 2  -0.271***
(-7.63)
crisis*ldepfi3*q 3  -0.270***
(-7.63)
crisis*ldepfi3*q 4  -0.264***
(-7.45)
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